




































AQUINNO VOLUME 4 ISSUE 3 DECEMBER 2024.cdr


UNDERSTANDING HEIDEGGER'S ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE I
N RELATION TO TEMPORALITY AND TIME

Peter  Iorhom Akunoko, Ph.D
Department of Philosophy

Benue State University, Makurdi
akunoko.peter@gmail.com/pakunoko@bsum.edu.ng

ABSTRACT

In his quest to unravel the mystery behind the meaning of Being, Heidegger discovered that the 
manner in which this question was raised in traditional ontology is the reason for the 
forgetfulness of Being. So it became pertinent for Heidegger to do something new by moving 
away from the traditional method of raising the question of Being in order to rescue Being from 
its forgetfulness. In establishing a new ontology Heidegger identified a particular kind of Being 
that its understanding can provide an inroad into the understanding of Being in general. This 
Being Heidegger designates as Dasein. In an attempt to understand the Being of Dasein, 
Heidegger holds that the knowledge of this Being is only possible through carrying out an explicit 
distinction between Being and beings. This kind of distinction Heidegger calls 'ontological 
difference'. For Heidegger this distinction is only possible in relation to temporality and time 
because time constitutes the horizon for the understanding of Being. Taking Heidegger's 
phenomenological insights even further, this paper considers the question of ontological 
difference and the relationship between time and temporality. What we intend to explain in this 
paper is the distinction between Being and beings and to establish whether temporality can 
simply be referred to as time. With Heidegger, this paper submits that the Being of Dasein is 
intrinsically connected to temporality and time. The Being of Dasein is that of existence and 
existence is only possible within the framework of time. Dasein also defines time and its 
temporal moments. Dasein is a being that creates history through its actions on the world. The 
performance of any kind of action at all is always the present action of Dasein aims at affecting 
the world. These human actions are projected in the future perfect tense. In this light, time 
becomes more than the mere flowing time of the clock but acquires a new meaningfulness 
defined by human actions.

Keywords: Being, Dasein, temporality, time, ontological difference, existentielle, ontic.

INTRODUCTION

The main goal in Heidegger's ontology is the study of Being. In his quest to unravel the mystery 
behind the meaning of Being, Heidegger discovered that the manner in which this question was 
raised in traditional ontology is the reason for the forgetfulness of Being. So it became pertinent 
for Heidegger to do something new by moving away from the traditional method of raising the 
question of Being in order to rescue Being from its forgetfulness. In establishing a new ontology 
Heidegger identifies a particular kind of Being that its understanding can provide an inroad into 
the understanding of Being in general. This Being Heidegger designates as Dasein. This is a 
Being that is capable of understanding itself and other beings around it.  In an attempt to 
understand the Being of Dasein Heidegger holds that the knowledge of this Being is only 
possible through carrying out an explicit distinction between Being and beings. This kind of 
distinction Heidegger calls 'ontological difference'. For Heidegger this distinction is only 
possible in relation to temporality and time. This is because time constitutes the horizon for the 

133



understanding of Being. It may appear so simple to say that ontological difference is simply an 
explicit distinction between Being and beings but Heidegger's goal is far more than such a 
simplistic explanation. What Heidegger had in mind was to establish the prime place of Dasein in 
understanding the question of the meaning of Being in general. Heidegger intended to show that 
the three modes of being are fundamentally structured by modes of time and temporality. It is 
within the framework of time that Dasein is able to establish its ontic-ontological priority over 
other beings. Heidegger also shows that the varieties of time are bound up together by the 
complex relations of degeneration and dependence. Ordinary time is seen as a degenerative form 
of world-time, and world-time a degenerative form of originary temporality. It is precisely in 
these relations of degeneration that the distinction between time and temporality is resolved. 

UNDERSTANDING THE 'ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE'

For one to properly understand Heidegger's ontological difference one has to first of all 
understand an important distinction he made between the ontological and the ontic. Heidegger 
(1962) writes “understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein 
is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.” The ontological in this regard refers to the Being 
of a particular being, while the ontic refers to what a particular being can do or does. Dasein, for 
instance, is different from other beings ontically because its ontological nature makes it possible 
for Dasein to question its own Being. This questioning of the meaning of Being which is peculiar 
to Dasein has established Dasein as having ontological priority of the question of the meaning of 
Being over other sciences. However, for Large (2008, 25-26) the most important reason why 
Heidegger thinks we should treat this question seriously is the ontic priority of the questioner.

Ontology is the study of being, or of what it means for something to be what it is. Heidegger 
contrasts ontology with ontic investigations, which are studies of particular beings, rather than 
their being. To an extent, then, what other sciences do cannot be referred to as ontology without 
qualification. The investigation of other sciences can best be referred to as regional ontologies 
that deal with particular aspects of Being. There is only one being, however, who asks the 
question in the first place—and that is myself. No doubt, I can be treated as though I were like any 
other being (this is what the sciences such as psychology and anthropology do) but I am also very 
different from other beings because I am the only being who is capable of asking what other 
beings are (Large, 2008:26). What Heidegger means here is that it is only Dasein that tries to 
understand itself and the totality of existence.

Of course, Heidegger's concern was not to clarify the being of particular things. It was to 
understand the meaning of being in general, or what it means to be at all. But, in order to properly 
ask this question, he first had to answer another: What does it mean to be human? Fernandez 
(2018, 27) notes that for Heidegger, we need to articulate the essence of human existence before 
we can properly inquire into the meaning of being as such. This is because human beings are the 
ones who ask ontological questions in the first place. Human beings are “pre-ontological”, 
because they already have some vague understanding of what it means to be. The question is, how 
does Heidegger approach the distinctive ontology of the human being? In Being and Time, he 
aims to discover and describe the basic “structures” of human existence. These are “not just any 
accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factical Dasein may 
possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being” (Heidegger 1962, 38). By 
"factical Dasein," he refers to a particular human existence, a human being with a concrete 
history, situation, and so on ( ). In other words, Heidegger's goal is to discover Fernandez 2018, 29
those structures of human existence that hold across all particular human beings.

Heidegger goes on, then, to make a clear distinction between the existential and the existentielle 
in his attempt to establish Dasein's ontic-ontological priority for a clearer explanation of 

134

                                            Aquino Journal of Philosophy, Vol 4 Issue 3, December 2024.
ISSN: 2786-9792



ontological difference. Existence for Heidegger is completely individual. Only I can live my life. 
However, my life is characterised by the possibilities of choices. These choices I make in my 
life—which are mine even if I disavow them—are described by Heidegger through the 
neologism “Existentielle” (Large, 28). It means that the ontic categories of Dasein, all that 
Dasein does, together constitute existentielle. Heidegger, on the other hand, refers to the 
ontological categories—the Being of Dasein as care, as always being with others and as 
futural—as the existential nature of Dasein. The understanding of the existential nature of Dasein 
is only possible through the existentelle. The opposite of the existential understanding of Being is 
the categorical. The categorical understanding of Being relates to those beings which I encounter 
in the world (Large, 28). These categorical beings are particular entities we encounter daily in our 
existence. They are objects of concern. Heidegger does not dismiss these categorical beings, 
rather he argues they are utterly inadequate to investigating the existential meaning of Being 
(Large, 28).

Dasein is a Being that is thrown into a world with historical circumstance and projects itself in 
that world towards possibilities. Dasein is born (thrown) into a time and culture which he does 
not choose. In existing in the world, Dasein exists with some limitations which he nevertheless 
may overcome because of his interests and concerns about the world in which he exists. This 
means that Daseinis thrown in the world with other entities which are not of the character of 
Dasein. However, Dasein is a Being that cares about its Being and other beings because of its 
existential character. Dasein comports itself towards itself and toward beings. This comportment 
is possible for Dasein because of the ecstatic character of temporality which makes it possible for 
Dasein to deal existentially with others and other beings that are either handy or extant. 
Temporality makes it possible the understanding of Being and it is only in the light of this 
understanding of Being that Dasein can comport itself toward its own self and toward others as 
beings.

However, it is only in existence that Dasein understands beings and comportsitself towards 
beings. Heidegger holds that it is in existence that the difference between Being and beings is 
located. He remarks:

The distinction between Being and beings is there (ist da), latent in the 
Dasein and its existence, even if not in explicit awareness. The 
distinction is there; that is to say, it has the mode of Being of the 
Dasein: it belongs to existence. Existence means, as it were, to be in 
the performance of this distinction (1982, 319).

This means that the Being of Dasein is different from any other being which is not of the character 
of Dasein. It is only Dasein that really exist and has the capacity to understand its Being and other 
beings around it in its existence. This implies that the difference between Being and beings is in 
Dasein's existence. However, according to Heidegger this difference becomes manifest on the 
basis of temporality because it belongs to the Dasein's existence the immediate unity of 
understanding of Being and comportment towards beings.

For Heidegger only because this distinction belongs to existence can the distinction become 
explicit in different ways:

Because when this distinction between Being and beings becomes 
explicit the terms distinguished contrast with each other, Being 
thereby becomes a possible theme for conceptual comprehension 
(Logos). For this reason we call the distinction between Being and 
beings, when it is carried out explicitly, the ontological difference. 
(1982, 319)

135

Peter  Iorhom Akunoko                                Understanding Heidegger's Ontological Difference...



This quotation shows that the whole question of ontological difference lies in the explicit 
distinction between Being and beings. The ontic claim of ontological difference is the distinction 
of Being and beings, by claiming that it applies to all the ontological different ways of Being. 
Thus, there is an ontological difference between Dasein and ready-to-hand entities (Zuhanden); 
between lives (like animals or plants) and present-at-hand entities (Vorhanden); between abstract 
objects (like numbers) and Dasein. Since they enjoy different kinds of Being, there is an 
ontological differentiation among them (Gandellini, 2018, 146). 

The major position of ontological claim of ontological difference is that Dasien is different from 
present-at-hand and ready-to-hand entities. This establishes the peculiarity of Dasein, namely its 
understanding of Being. The decisive phenomenon we have met is the original fact in the essence 
of Dasein itself, the fact that we understand something as Being or, more clearly, that we make 
distinction between beings and Being of beings. Understanding of Beingis the possibility of the 
realization of this distinction between beings and Being or, shortly, the possibility of the 
ontological difference (Gandellini,2018, 147). Ontological difference shows the distinction 
between Beings and being, which allows Dasein to understand Being in the proper sense This 
distinction we have seen lies in existence as the basic character of Dasein. It is precisely in this 
distinction between Being and beings that Heidegger brings out clearly the objectification of 
positive science (science of beings) and transcendental ontology or science which is the science 
of Being. In this objectification, Heidegger also establishes a distinction between temporality 
(Zeitlichkeit) which has to do with the science of beings and temporality (Temporalitat) which is 
actually the temporality of Being rooted in existence as the basic character of Dasein.

Scholars have argued that Heidegger's ontological difference goes beyond just the explicit 
distinction between Being and beings which rest on the ontic claim but added the meta-
ontological dimension to deepen the understanding of ontological difference. Meta-ontological 
claim (MOC) expresses the traditionally overworked idea that Being “is” something different 
from beings. Since Being “is” what determines beings as beings, it must not be a being itself (in 
order to avoid the infinite regress). Being must be something different from beings.  Something is 
if it is an entity, so one missed the point of ontological difference by saying that “Being is”, 
because he would treat Being as an entity. Therefore, a plausible rephrasing of (MOC) is “Being 
is not an entity, a being” (Gandellini, 2018, 145-146). This is a meta-ontological claim because it 
ranges over the “ontological” domain and the “ontic” domain, by ensuring a distinction among 
them: indeed, the one between Being and beings. Gandellini (2018, 146) further notes that by 
separating Being from beings, OD succeeds in defining the reference environment of both 
ontology and metaphysics. In other terms, it provides the epistemological criterion that 
distinguishes ontology (the inquiry on Being) and metaphysics (the science of beings as such).

Heidegger holds that with the factical existence of the Dasein, beings are always already 
unveiled. Furthermore, in the understanding of Being that goes with them Being is also already 
unveiled. In this factical existence of the Dasein, two essential fundamental possibilities of 
objectification are posited. Despite this objectification of Being and beings, they are manifestly 
related to each other regardless of their fundamental diversity. Heidegger (1982, 321) remarks:

Because the carrying out of the distinction between Being and beings 
is always already proceeding in the Dasein's temporality, temporality 
is the root and the ground for both the possibility and properly 
understood, the factical necessity of the objectification of the given 
beings and Being. 

This is to say that temporality is that of Dasein and it is when Being is unveiled that beings can be 
unveiled. The objectification of that which is (beings) in which the positive sciences variously 
constitute themselves has its centre in the projection of the ontological constitution of the beings 

136

                                            Aquino Journal of Philosophy, Vol 4 Issue 3, December 2024.
ISSN: 2786-9792



which are to become objects. This projection of the ontological constitution of the region of 
beings, which is the essential nature of the objectification that is foundational for the positive 
sciences, is nevertheless not an ontological investigation of the Being of beings in question. 
However, there is still pre-ontological awareness in the positive sciences, because what gives the 
positive sciences their validity relates pre-ontologically to the Being of beings. Yet this does not 
mean that the positive sciences have entered the domain of ontology.

What then is the kind of science that rightfully occupies the domain of ontology? This kind of 
science is what Heidegger refers to as “temporal science” (1982, 323). This is because all truths 
of ontology are temporal propositions. Their truths unveil structures and possibilities of being in 
the light of temporality. This is a kind of science that is transcendent where Dasein surpasses itself 
in transcendence. This means that transcendence makes possible existence in the sense of 
comporting oneself to oneself as a Being and to others as beings. However, this transcendental 
science is rooted in temporality which provides it with its horizon. Time then becomes the 
primary horizon of transcendental science or ontology.

It is important to note that the analysis so far shows that in Dasein's existence there is an 
essentially twofold possibility of objectification of the given. This Dasein's existence establishes 
two basic types of science which are the objectification of beings as positive science and 
objectification of Being as temporal or transcendental science, ontology or philosophy. No 
understanding of Being is possible that would not be rooted in a comportment toward beings. 
Understanding of Being and comportment to beings are readily present by means of temporality. 
This method of ontology is nothing but the sequence of the steps involved in the approach to 
Being as such and the elaboration of its structure.

TEMPORALITY AND TIME

Heidegger is of the opinion that his interpretation of Dasein does violence to the everyday 
understanding of human existence. He says that originary temporality explains time, and for that 
reason it deserves the title of originary time. Explaining Heidegger's originary temporality 
William Blattner (2005) states that:

So, when we have shown that the “time” that is accessible to Dasein's 
intelligibility is not originary and, what is more, that it arises out of 
authentic temporality, then we are justified in accordance with the 
proposition, a postiori fit denominatio, in labeling temporality, which 
has just been exhibited, originary time (316).

Time as we encounter it in our everyday experience is not originary. Heidegger distinguishes, in 
fact, two kinds of everyday time, world-time and time as ordinarily conceived. Time as we 
ordinarily conceive it is time as the pure container of events. World-time is the sequence of 
meaningfully articulated, everyday times e.g. bed time, dinner time, etc. World-time differs from 
ordinary time in that the times of world-time are overtly defined in terms of their relation to 
human interests, whereas ordinary times are conceptualized as independent of human interests. 
Thus, the distinction between ordinary time and world-time shares some of the contours of the 
distinction between the available and the occurrent The available (Zuhanden) is the 
paraphernalia of human life, all of the things that are what they are in virtue of the way they are 
involved in human practices. The occurrent (Vorhanden or present-at-hand), however, is what is 
independently of human practices.

 According to Heidegger, the world is that in which factical Dasein lives (1962, 93).This world is 
articulated temporally, that is, things happen in the world and they can be measured in part by 
when and for how long they happen. These are the contentful, meaningful times in terms of which 

137

Peter  Iorhom Akunoko                                Understanding Heidegger's Ontological Difference...



we lead our lives, and they make up world-time. Ordinary time, however, is the pure flow of 
clock-time, meaningless, empty and potentially precise. It is, as Heidegger says, a “pure 
succession” (1962, 474). The characteristic datability and significance of world-time are 
missing. One might infer from all this that ordinary time is somehow more real than world-time, 
because it is more independent. Whereas world-time depends crucially on human practices in 
order to be what it is, ordinary time does not seem to do so. However, for Heidegger, no time is 
completely independent of Dasein.

He explains this in what he calls temporal idealism. Temporal idealism is the thesis that time 
depends on Dasein (1962, 377). Time depends on Dasein, insofar as it depends on Dasein's 
originary temporality. Primordial or originary temporality is a formal structure of Dasein's being 
and so, in this sense world-time and natural time (ordinary) depend on the being of Dasein. This 
means that time belongs to Dasein's Being. Blattner (2005, 318) notes that, for Heidegger, one 
cannot say “time is” because time is not an entity or a thing. Rather, it is more accurate to say that 
“time temporalizes itself” (die zeitzeitigtsich).

So, to say that time depends on primordial temporality is not to say that there will not be time if 
originary temporality were not. What this means is that originary temporality is the ground from 
which ordinary time and world-time spring from. Hence, by understanding what Heidegger 
means in writing that time arises out of originary temporality, we can see both what he has in mind 
by way of time's dependence on originary temporality and why he thinks that originary 
temporality is a kind of time. By 'arise out of', Heidegger refers to a kind of degeneration that is 
common in the field of ontology. For Heidegger (1962), the ontological source of Dasein's Being 
is not inferior to what springs from it, but towers above it in power from the outset; in the field of 
ontology, any 'springing-from' is degeneration (383). By degeneration here, Heidegger is 
referring to a condition of change that takes place when one form of time changes into another. 
When this change occurs, a certain form of time loses some basic characteristics that make it what 
it is. This kind of change is what Heidegger refers to as degeneration or leveling off. This is why 
Heidegger described ordinary time as leveled off world-time. World-time is leveled off into 

'ordinary time, in that the datability and significance of word-time are 'covered up so that time 
seems merely to be a pure succession of 'nows'. This shows that datability and significance are the 
basic characteristics of world-time that are lost as a result of this degeneration. 'Nows' are public 
in that they are not the private possession or horizon of an individual or group, but rather 
accessible to all as a horizon for measuring events. Ordinary 'nows' are spanned and public, but 
not datable and significant.

Just as ordinary time is a levelled-off version of world-time, so world-time is a leveled-off form 
of originary temporality. Heidegger holds that, Dasein's Being-amidst (sein-bei) inwardly 
entities belongs to the structure of care, and its temporal meaning is enpresenting (Blattner, 2005, 
320). This means that Dasein's relation to the worldly entities and events that surround it, and 
thus to the meaningful time in which the events and entities take place and find their location, is 
but one element of the structure of originary temporality. The degeneration of originary 
temporality into world-time is a reduction in the sense of a disconnection, an abstraction, of the 
world-time now from its home in originary temporality. This abstraction of the now, however, 
should not be thought of on the model of the medieval conception of the standing now. The world-
time now is not disconnected from its own past and future, that is, from other world-time 'nows'. 
The standing now was conceived as a 'now', a moment of time with no past and no future, 
asingular, isolated moment of time. 

When Heidegger talks about the world-time now stretching from world-time past and world-time 
future he is referring to the way events which characterize world-time now are connected to the 
events which are past and those in the future. This world-time now is isolated from the originary 

138

                                            Aquino Journal of Philosophy, Vol 4 Issue 3, December 2024.
ISSN: 2786-9792



past and originary future. This is because the ecstasy of the original future is Dasein's pressing 
ahead to its possibilities which will never come to be present as an event. Likewise, the original 
past is Dasein's being already, and its horizon is the way things matter to Dasein, its attunements. 
These attunements are the drag that situates and concretizes the thrust of Dasein's projection 
towards possibilities. They do not belong to the sequential past as the various episodes of my life 
history. These attunements were not at one time present after which they slipped into a past. 
Rather these attunements always characterize Dasein. The world-time 'now' is intrinsically 
spanned or stretched from world-time past (no-longer-now) to a world-time future (not-yet-
now). It is thus stretched, Heidegger argues, because it is a significant now, a now defined by the 
relations implied in the in-order to. The world-time now is inherently spanned or stretched from a 
before to an after. It is significant, datable, spanned, public, and sequential or successive.

This world-time now-structure is, however, embedded in originary temporality as merely one of 
the later's ecstasies. The structural unity of the ecstasies of the temporality of circumspective 
concern depends upon the unity of originary temporality. This is because originary temporality is 
the formal structure of Dasein's Being, and in this sense, word-time now and natural time depend 
on the Being of Dasein. The world-time now necessarily spans from the before to the after, 
because it is embedded in the structure of original temporality. Now we can recognize 
phenomenologically that the 'now' experienced in engaged everyday practice is part of a larger 
whole, the whole that is the care-structure of Dasein. Heidegger calls the structural unity of care 
originary temporality. When one considers this above, however, one quickly arrives at the 
question of why originary temporality should be thought of as a kind of time at all. Heidegger 
answers by showing how if we do classify primordial or originary temporality as a form of time, 
we are able to explain aspects of ordinary time that otherwise remain mysterious, such as its 
continuity. The continuity of natural time is the way in which natural times stretch back to their 
immediate past and forward to their immediate future. This continuity of natural time remains a 
brute fact about time and can only be explained metaphysically. For this reason, metaphysicians 
have long sought to do so, but always failed. Heidegger's suggestion is that, we can only explain 
the continuity of natural time as a reduced or leveled off form of the span of world-time. The 
spannedness of world-time is merely a leveled off form of the inherent unity of original 
temporality, the way in which the originary future and originary past are intrinsically bound up 
with one another and with the originary present, which opens up the now for us. In short, 
originary temporality should be called a form of time.

Heidegger, then, concludes that, the three varieties of time (originaltemporality, world-time and 
ordinary time) form a degenerating series. It is onlywhen we understand ordinary time as a 
thinned out or reduced version of world-time, and we regard world time as a disconnected form of 
originary temporality that we can explain the continuity of time. It is only when we accept this 
account in terms of degeneration that we can refer to originary temporality as a form of time. 
However, primordial temporality cannot be regarded simply as time as it is ordinarily conceived.

CONCLUSION

The paper has shown that the Being of Dasein is intrinsically connected to temporality and time. 
The Being of Dasein is that of existence and existence is only possible within the framework of 
time. But why is it that the Being of Dasein is this important in Heidegger's attempt to understand 
the meaning of Being in general. This is because Dasein is the only being that tries to understand 
itself and other beings. Dasein tries to make sense of the world in which he lives. It is clear from 
the foregoing that Dasein, existing within the framework of time, also defines time and its 
temporal moments. Dasein is a being that creates history through its actions on the world. This 
means that history is as a result of the past actions of Dasein. The performance of any kind of 

139

Peter  Iorhom Akunoko                                Understanding Heidegger's Ontological Difference...



action at all is always the present action of Dasein aims at affecting the world. How then are these 
human actions conceived? They are projected in the future perfect tense. Actions have both 
because-motives and in-order-to motives. The because-motive propels Dasein to act with a telos 
in mind which constitutes the in-order-to motives. By and large, time is not the mere flowing time 
of the clock but the meaningful time of humans; human activity is what makes time time.

REFERENCES

Blattner, W. D. (1999). Heidegger's temporal idealism. Cambridge University Press.

Blattner, W. D. (2005). Temporality. In A companion to Heidegger. Eds.Hubert. L. Drufus, Mark. 
A. Wrathall. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Fenandez A. V. (2018). Beyond the ontological difference: Heidegger, Binswanger, and the future 
of existential analysis. Rowman and Littlefield.

Gandellini, F. (2018). The “Ontological Difference” again: a Dialectheic perspective on 
Heidegger's mainstay. https://doi.org/10.1515/opphil-2018-0011.

Large, W. (2008). Heidegger's Being and Time. Edinburgh University Press Limited.

Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and time. Transl. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson. Harper 
and Row.

Heidegger, M. (1982). The basic problems of Phenomenology. Transl. Albert Hofstandter. 
Indiana University Press.

140

                                            Aquino Journal of Philosophy, Vol 4 Issue 3, December 2024.
ISSN: 2786-9792


